- 6 -
(B) the divorce or separation instrument does not
designate such payment as a payment which is not
includible in gross income under this section and not
allowable as a deduction under section 215,
(C) in the case of an individual legally separated
from his spouse under a decree of divorce or of
separate maintenance, the payee spouse and the payor
spouse are not members of the same household at the
time such payment is made, and
(D) there is no liability to make any such payment
for any period after the death of the payee spouse and
there is no liability to make any payment (in cash or
property) as a substitute for such payments after the
death of the payee spouse.
If the payor is liable for any qualifying payment after the
recipient’s death, none of the related payments required will be
taxed as alimony. Sec. 1.71-1T(b), Q&A-13, Temporary Income Tax
Regs., 49 Fed. Reg. 34456 (Aug. 31, 1984). Whether a postdeath
obligation exists may be determined by the terms of the divorce
or separation instrument or, if the instrument is silent on the
matter, by State law. Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 80-81
(1940); see Rogers v. Commissioner, supra. The parties agree
that the divorce decree does not provide any conditions for the
termination of the payment.
Tennessee law provides for three kinds of alimony: Alimony
in futuro, alimony in solido, and rehabilitative alimony. See
Burlew v. Burlew, 40 S.W.3d 465, 470-471 (Tenn. 2001); see also
Self v. Self, 861 S.W.2d 360, 363 (Tenn. 1993). Alimony in
futuro is awarded to provide financial support to a spouse who
cannot be rehabilitated. Burlew v. Burlew, supra at 471. It is
Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011