Hoyt W. and Barbara D. Young, et al. - Page 60

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                    e.   Direct Obligations--Additional Amounts                       
               At first blush, it would appear that the amount potentially            
          recoverable with respect to the Izen fee request (reasonable                
          attorney’s fee of $120,496.56 plus reasonable expenses of                   
          $3,417.84 equals $123,914.40) far exceeds the amount paid or                
          incurred by eligible persons ($4,600 + $74,400 = $79,000).  That            
          is not the end of the story, however.  On the basis of the                  
          authority discussed below, we construe the Izen appellate                   
          contracts as creating additional payment obligations that                   
          eliminate the apparent shortfall.                                           
               In Phillips v. GSA, 924 F.2d 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1991), the                
          Court of Appeals awarded Ms. Phillips more than $9,000 in                   
          attorney’s fees under the EAJA (which similarly limits awards to            
          amounts “incurred”), even though her attorney had agreed to                 
          prosecute her appeal for a flat fee of $2,500.  In an affidavit             
          submitted with the fee application (and quoted by the Court of              
          Appeals), the attorney described the fee arrangement as follows:            
               “She was to pay me $2500 of her back pay for the appeal                
               and I was to charge her no more.  The recovery would                   
               then be contingent upon success, recovery to be based                  
               upon a statutory fee award if we prevailed.  We kept                   
               bookkeeping entries of my time, but once the $2500 was                 
               paid by the client, she was not responsible for further                
               payment of our charges * * * ”  [Id. at 1582.]                         
          The Government argued that Ms. Phillips’s fee award should be               
          limited to $2,500, “because that is all she has paid, or is                 
          obligated to pay, to her attorney.”  Id.  The Court of Appeals,             
          noting that the EAJA provides for an award “to the ‘prevailing              




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