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However, for the sake of completeness, the Court would note
briefly that even if the Court were to deny respondent’s motion
and/or rule against respondent on the duty of consistency
argument, none of the theories advanced by petitioners would be
sufficient to overcome the form of the E Trade account and thus
to show that transactions therein should be considered those of
Mr. Arberg. To highlight a few shortcomings, the Court would
begin by observing that petitioners have generally failed to
introduce evidence that would establish the factual predicate for
the doctrines they cite.
As to an alleged power of attorney, petitioners have not
proffered even one document related to any such grant of
authority. Furthermore, even if the record corroborated a power
of attorney in favor of Mr. Arberg, that fact would actually cut
against petitioners’ position, indicating instead that Mr. Arberg
was acting on Ms. Quinn’s behalf and dealing with her property,
not his own.
Likewise, to show either a resulting or a constructive trust
under Georgia law, petitioners would need as a threshold matter
to establish the source of the funding for the E Trade account.
See Ga. Code Ann. secs. 53-12-91, 53-12-92, 53-12-93 (1997). Yet
petitioners did not introduce any document related to tracing the
moneys deposited in the E Trade account (or, for that matter,
even to the opening of the account) and only testified generally
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