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that funds came from Mr. Arberg’s work. They made no explicit
claim regarding an exclusive source and certainly offered no
information as to the possibility of prior commingling, nor did
they discuss or address any other potentially relevant issues.
Lastly, with respect to their so-called legal preclusion
doctrine, petitioners have again failed to make a predicate
factual showing. See Commissioner v. First Sec. Bank of Utah,
N.A., 405 U.S. 394, 395, 403 (1972) (declining to permit
allocation of income by the Commissioner under section 482 to a
taxpayer “that he did not receive and that he was prohibited from
receiving”). Although petitioners state on brief that Ms. Quinn
was prohibited due to her employment from beneficially owning a
securities account or trading in securities for her own account,
they testified that she received permission from her supervisor
to establish the E Trade account. They introduced no evidence or
testimony to delineate the parameters or conditions of any such
permission, so the Court is unable to evaluate limitations as to
this particular account.
Accordingly, without even delving into the host of legal
strictures and requisites that would bear upon the applicability
of petitioners’ theories, the Court is satisfied that patent
deficiencies in the underlying factual record would short circuit
petitioners’ attempts to reach their desired result through these
avenues. Therefore, the transactions in the E Trade account must
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