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not limited to matter contained in respondent’s administrative
record”. Id. at 44. Respondent urges us to reconsider that
position since the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit vacated our decision in Ewing on jurisdictional grounds.3
See Commissioner v. Ewing, 439 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2006), revg.
118 T.C. 494 (2002), vacating 122 T.C. 32 (2004).
Assuming arguendo that we were to accept respondent’s
position that, in determining whether petitioner is entitled to
relief under section 6015(f), we should consider only respon-
dent’s administrative record with respect to petitioner’s taxable
years at issue, on the record before us, we find that petitioner
has carried her burden of showing that respondent abused respon-
dent’s discretion in denying her such relief with respect to the
unpaid liabilities for the years at issue.4 We turn now to the
factors set forth in section 4.03(2)(a) of Revenue Procedure
3In further support of respondent’s position that, in deter-
mining whether petitioner is entitled to relief under sec.
6015(f), we should consider only respondent’s administrative
record with respect to petitioner’s taxable years at issue,
respondent relies on Robinette v. Commissioner, 439 F.3d 455 (8th
Cir. 2006), revg. 123 T.C. 85 (2004), a case under sec. 6330.
The Court to which an appeal in this case would ordinarily lie is
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. We
are not bound by Robinette. See Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.
742, 757 (1970), affd. 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971).
4If, as we held in Ewing v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 32
(2004), we were to consider in this case respondent’s administra-
tive record with respect to petitioner’s taxable years at issue
as well as matters that the parties stipulated that are not part
of that administrative record, our holding under sec. 6015(f)
would remain the same.
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