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further agree that petitioner did not “constructively” receive
the reward in 1999. Instead, as we view the situation, she
actually received the reward during that year.5 Petitioner’s
reliance upon the doctrine of constructive receipt ignores the
simple fact that it was petitioner who volunteered6 to place the
reward in the custody of the bankruptcy court. The “dominion and
control” over the reward implicit in her decision to do so
completely undermines petitioner’s claim that she lacked any
such dominion or control over the reward. See Sullivan v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-341. For what it’s worth, we think
it also important to note that the doctrine of constructive
receipt, in general, addresses questions regarding when, not
whether, income is realized by a cash basis taxpayer. Taken to
its extremes, petitioner’s argument would suggest that because
Proulx ultimately prevailed, the reward would never be includable
in her income. Such a conclusion is wholly inconsistent with the
5 Although not expressly addressed by the parties, it is
clear from their respective positions that petitioner computed
her 1999 Federal income tax liability in accordance with the cash
receipts and disbursements method of accounting (cash basis).
Sec. 1.446-1(c)(1)(i), Income Tax Regs., provides, in part, as
follows: “Generally, under the cash receipts and disbursements
method in the computation of taxable income, all items which
constitute gross income * * * are to be included for the taxable
year in which actually or constructively received.”
6 We appreciate petitioner’s point that it was a hard
choice. Nevertheless, it was her choice.
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