Thomas Andrew and Diane Koerner Campbell - Page 10




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          Court’s test in Commissioner v. Schleier, supra at 337, we need             
          not decide whether the underlying claim giving rise to the award,           
          i.e., OTS’s violation of the RIF regulations in effecting Mrs.              
          Campbell’s demotion, involved tort or tort type rights.6                    
               In deciding whether damages were received “on account of               
          personal injuries or sickness”, the Supreme Court has construed             
          section 104(a)(2) to require that a damage award be more than               


               6   For the sake of completeness, we note that petitioners’            
          contention that, under the Supreme Court’s opinion in United                
          States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992), a taxpayer need prove only            
          that the claim underlying a damage award was based on “tort or              
          tort type rights” for the award to be excludable under pre-1996             
          sec. 104(a)(2), was expressly rejected by the Supreme Court in              
          Commissioner v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 336 (1995):                         
               Second, and more importantly, the holding of Burke is                  
               narrower than * * * [the taxpayer] suggests.  In Burke,                
               following the framework established in the Internal                    
               Revenue Service regulations, we noted that § 104(a)(2)                 
               requires a determination whether the underlying action                 
               is “based upon tort or tort type rights.”  * * *  In so                
               doing, however, we did not hold that the inquiry into                  
               “tort or tort type rights” constituted the beginning                   
               and end of the analysis.  In particular, though Burke                  
               relied on Title VII’s failure to qualify as an action                  
               based upon tort type rights, we did not intend to                      
               eliminate the basic requirement found in both the                      
               statute and the regulation that only amounts received                  
               “on account of personal injuries or sickness” come                     
               within § 104(a)(2)’s exclusion.  Thus, though                          
               satisfaction of Burke’s “tort or tort type” inquiry is                 
               a necessary condition for excludability under §                        
               104(a)(2), it is not a sufficient condition.  [Fn. ref.                
               omitted.]                                                              
          Thus, contrary to petitioners’ argument, both elements of the               
          Schleier test must be satisfied in order for the sec. 104(a)(2)             
          exclusion to apply.  Commissioner v. Schleier, supra at 337;                
          United States v. Burke, supra at 233.                                       






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