- 26 - Fargo to support that conclusion. See Keller v. Commissioner, supra; Barnes v. Commissioner, supra. Respondent’s rejection of petitioners’ longstanding case argument was not arbitrary or capricious. 2. The IRM Example Petitioners argue that respondent erred when he determined that they were not entitled to relief based on the second example in IRM section 5.8.11.2.2. Petitioners assert that many of the facts in this case were not present in the example, and, therefore, any reliance on the example was misplaced. Petitioners’ argument is not persuasive. IRM section 5.8.11.2.2 discusses effective tax administration offers-in-compromise based on equity and public policy grounds and states in the second example: In 1983, the taxpayer invested in a nationally marketed partnership which promised the taxpayer tax benefits far exceeding the amount of the investment. Immediately upon investing, the taxpayer claimed investment tax credits that significantly reduced or eliminated the tax liabilities for the years 1981 through 1983. In 1984, the IRS opened an audit of the partnership under the provisions of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA). After issuance of the Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment (FPAA), but prior to any proceedings in Tax Court, the IRS made a global settlement offer in which it offered to concede a substantial portion of the interest and penalties that could be expected to be assessed if the IRS’s determinations were upheld by the court. The taxpayer rejected the settlement offer. After several years of litigation, the partnership level proceeding eventually ended in Tax Court decisions upholding the vast majority of the deficiencies asserted in the FPAA on the grounds thatPage: Previous 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011