Laura K. Davis, et al. - Page 22

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          instituted and has maintained the proceedings in those cases                
          primarily for delay.  We further believe that, in support of that           
          goal, he raised frivolous arguments and relied on groundless                
          positions.  We have on more than one occasion during these                  
          consolidated proceedings stated our concern that petitioners had            
          raised meritless arguments that served merely to delay the                  
          collection of tax.  We accorded Mr. Davis both a hearing and the            
          opportunity to respond in writing to our concerns.  Neither by              
          his testimony, Ms. Osborn’s testimony, nor his written responses            
          to our orders to show cause has Mr. Davis shown us the merit of             
          any averment, claim, or argument advanced by him.5  In our orders           

               5  Unsupported by any citation of authority, Mr. Davis                 
          claims that the standard for imposition of a penalty under sec.             
          6673(a)(1) is bad faith.  In Takaba v. Commissioner, 119 T.C.               
          285, 294 n.2 (2002), we observed:                                           
                    There is some question whether it is necessary for                
               a court to find that a taxpayer acted in bad faith in                  
               order to impose a penalty on him under sec.                            
               6673(a)(1)(B) for putting forth a frivolous or                         
               groundless position.  Compare Branch v. I.R.S., 846                    
               F.2d 36, 37 (8th Cir. 1988) (“A taxpayer’s asserted                    
               good faith is not relevant to the assessment of                        
               frivolous return [sec. 6702] penalties.”) with May v.                  
               Commissioner, 752 F.2d 1301, 1306 (8th Cir. 1985)                      
               (“showing of willfulness, or lack of good faith, is                    
               required [for sec. 6673(a)(1) damages]”).                              
          We have not, however, required a showing of bad faith before                
          imposing a sec. 6673(a)(1)(B) penalty, see, e.g., Bean v.                   
          Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-88; Holmes v. Commissioner, T.C.              
          Memo. 2006-80; Wetzel v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-211, and             
          do not believe that to be a requirement of the statute.                     
          Moreover, we believe that the Court of Appeals for the Sixth                
          Circuit, where, barring a stipulation to the contrary, any appeal           

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