Laura K. Davis, et al. - Page 29

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                    3.  Unreasonable and Vexatious Conduct                            
               The purpose of section 6673(a)(2) is to penalize an attorney           
          for his misconduct in unreasonably and vexatiously multiplying              
          the proceedings.  Congress has not, however, specified the degree           
          of culpability that an attorney must exhibit before we may                  
          conclude that his conduct in multiplying the proceedings is                 
          unreasonable and vexatious.  See, e.g., Takaba v. Commissioner,             
          119 T.C. at 296-298 (2002).  The language of section 6673(a)(2)             
          is substantially identical to that of 28 U.S.C. sec. 1927 (the              
          two provisions serving the same purpose in different forums), and           
          we have relied on caselaw under the latter to ascertain the                 
          degree of culpability necessary to make an award under the                  
          former.  Takaba v. Commissioner, supra at 296-297.  While most of           
          the United States Courts of Appeals have required a showing of              
          bad faith before awarding costs under 28 U.S.C. sec. 1927, a few            
          have required only a showing of recklessness, a lesser degree of            
          culpability.  Id. at 297.  Among those few are both the Court of            
          Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, see Reliance Ins.             
          Co. v. Sweeney Corp., 792 F.2d 1137, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1986), and             
          the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, see Red Carpet                  
          Studios Div. of Source Advantage, Ltd. v. Sater, 465 F.3d 642,              
          646 (6th Cir. 2006).  The venue for appeal of any award of costs            
          imposed on Mr. Jones may be the Court of Appeals for the District           
          of Columbia Circuit.  See sec. 7482(b)(1) (second sentence);                

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