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3. Unreasonable and Vexatious Conduct
The purpose of section 6673(a)(2) is to penalize an attorney
for his misconduct in unreasonably and vexatiously multiplying
the proceedings. Congress has not, however, specified the degree
of culpability that an attorney must exhibit before we may
conclude that his conduct in multiplying the proceedings is
unreasonable and vexatious. See, e.g., Takaba v. Commissioner,
119 T.C. at 296-298 (2002). The language of section 6673(a)(2)
is substantially identical to that of 28 U.S.C. sec. 1927 (the
two provisions serving the same purpose in different forums), and
we have relied on caselaw under the latter to ascertain the
degree of culpability necessary to make an award under the
former. Takaba v. Commissioner, supra at 296-297. While most of
the United States Courts of Appeals have required a showing of
bad faith before awarding costs under 28 U.S.C. sec. 1927, a few
have required only a showing of recklessness, a lesser degree of
culpability. Id. at 297. Among those few are both the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, see Reliance Ins.
Co. v. Sweeney Corp., 792 F.2d 1137, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1986), and
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, see Red Carpet
Studios Div. of Source Advantage, Ltd. v. Sater, 465 F.3d 642,
646 (6th Cir. 2006). The venue for appeal of any award of costs
imposed on Mr. Jones may be the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit. See sec. 7482(b)(1) (second sentence);
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Last modified: November 10, 2007