- 17 -
considered the information actually given to her by petitioners.
With the exception of expenses that exceeded respondent’s
guidelines and excessive claimed tax expenses, Cochran allowed
the full amount of petitioners’ expenses. Moreover, Cochran
allowed the full $400 that petitioners claimed in medical
expenses even though they provided no documentation of any such
expenses. Finally, Cochran allowed petitioners more than a month
after their collection due process hearing to submit additional
documents to support their position. We find that Cochran gave
thorough consideration to all of petitioners’ claims.
Fourth, petitioners argue that public policy demands that
their offer-in-compromise be accepted because they were victims
of fraud. We disagree. While the regulations do not set forth a
specific standard for evaluating an offer-in-compromise based on
claims of public policy or equity, the regulations contain two
illustrative examples. See sec. 301.7122-1(c)(3)(iv), Examples
(1) and (2), Proced. & Admin. Regs. The first example describes
a taxpayer who is seriously ill and unable to file income tax
returns for several years. The second example describes a
taxpayer who received erroneous advice from the Commissioner as
to the tax effect of the taxpayer’s actions. Neither example
bears any resemblance to this case. See Speltz v. Commissioner,
454 F.3d at 786. Unlike the exceptional circumstances
exemplified in the regulations, petitioners’ situation is neither
Page: Previous 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 NextLast modified: May 25, 2011