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in the unenviable role of an insurer against poor business
decisions by taxpayers, reducing the incentive for taxpayers to
investigate thoroughly the consequences of transactions into
which they enter. It would be particularly inappropriate for the
Government to play that role here, where the transaction at issue
involves a tax shelter. Reducing the risks of participating in
tax shelters would encourage more taxpayers to run those risks,
thus undermining rather than enhancing compliance with the tax
laws.12 See Clayton v. Commissioner, supra; Barnes v.
Commissioner, supra.
Fifth, petitioners argue that Cochran failed to balance
efficient collection with the legitimate concern that collection
be no more intrusive than necessary. We disagree. Cochran
thoroughly considered this balancing issue on the basis of the
information and proposed collection alternative given to her by
petitioners. She concluded that “the proposed levy action
regarding the taxpayers represents the only efficient means for
12 Nor does the fact that petitioners’ case may be
“longstanding” overcome the detrimental impact on voluntary
compliance that could result from respondent’s accepting
petitioners’ offer-in-compromise. An example in IRM sec.
5.8.11.2.2 implicitly addresses the “longstanding” issue. There,
the taxpayer invested in a tax shelter in 1983, thereby incurring
tax liabilities for 1981 through 1983. He failed to accept a
settlement offer by respondent that would have eliminated a
substantial portion of his interest and penalties. Although the
example, which is similar to petitioners’ case in several
respects, would qualify as a “longstanding” case by petitioners’
standards, the offer was not acceptable because acceptance of it
would undermine compliance with the tax laws.
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