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compromise if its acceptance would undermine voluntary compliance
with tax laws by taxpayers in general. Thus, even if we were to
assume arguendo that petitioner would suffer economic hardship, a
finding that we decline to make, we would not find that Ms.
Cochran’s rejection of petitioner’s offer-in-compromise was an
abuse of discretion. As discussed below (in our discussion of
petitioner’s “equitable facts” argument), we conclude that
acceptance of petitioner’s offer-in-compromise would undermine
voluntary compliance with tax laws by taxpayers in general.
2. Public Policy and Equity Considerations
Petitioner asserts that respondent abused his discretion by
not accepting the equitable facts of this case as grounds for an
offer-in-compromise. In support of his assertion, petitioner
argues: (1) The longstanding nature of this case justifies
acceptance of the offer-in-compromise; and (2) respondent failed
to consider petitioner’s other “equitable facts”.12
12 Petitioner also argues that respondent abused his
discretion by relying on the second example in IRM sec.
5.8.11.2.2(3). This section deals with effective tax
administration offers-in-compromise. See 1 Administration,
Internal Revenue Manual (CCH), sec. 5.8.11.2.2(3), at 16,378. As
discussed above, petitioner does not qualify for an effective tax
administration offer-in-compromise because he does not have the
ability to pay his outstanding tax liability in full. Thus, we
need not consider whether the example in the IRM is analogous to
petitioner’s case.
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