- 15 - In Rhone-Poulenc Surfactants & Specialties, L.P. v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 533 (2000), we ruled that section 6229(a) does not restrict the time in which the Commissioner may challenge a partnership return, but only ensures that he has at least three years in which to exercise it.18 We also held that the suspension described in section 6229(d) affects “any open period of limitations applicable to petitioner on the date the FPAA was issued * * *.” Rhone-Poulenc, 114 T.C. at 554. The “period of limitations” we referred to is supplied by section 6501, which (with several exceptions) sets a three-year limitations period, measured from the filing or due date of a return, for the Commissioner to assess taxes or issue a notice of deficiency. Kligfeld’s first argument is based on that section. 18 At least two other courts--the D.C. Circuit and the Court of Federal Claims--have agreed with our interpretation of section 6229(a) as creating a minimum, not a maximum, time limit for the Commissioner to adjust partnership items. Each court noted that construing the section in this way not only honors its plain language, but furthers the Code’s goal of treating all partnership items alike. See Andantech L.L.C. v. Commissioner, 331 F.3d 972, 977 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (plain language of section 6229(a) indicates a minimum period of assessment for partnership items), affg. T.C. Memo. 2002-97; Grapevine Imp. Ltd. v. United States, 71 Fed. Cl. 324, 332-35 (2006) (legislative history supports the conclusion that section 6229(a) augments the basic statute of limitations, ensuring the IRS has sufficient time to scrutinize certain types of transactions); Rhone-Poulenc, 114 T.C. at 544-45 (section 6229(a) provides standard minimum period of time to assess partnership items for all partners; if Congress intended a different meaning, it would have used different language).Page: Previous 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 NextLast modified: November 10, 2007