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of due process--for why our reading of section 6229 in Rhone-
Poulenc leaves enough room for this distinction to make a
difference.
Kligfeld’s first argument arises from the Commissioner’s
assertion in this case--an assertion he likewise made in Rhone-
Poulenc--that section 6229 imposes no time limit on his authority
to issue an FPAA for any taxable year of any partnership.20
Kligfeld contends that this ignores the admonition given by the
Supreme Court over sixty years ago that it “would be all but
intolerable * * * to have an income tax system” in which “both
the taxpayer and the Government * * * [must] stand ready forever
and a day” to contest a tax assessment. Rothensies v. Elec.
Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296, 301 (1946).
This may be true as a background principle of tax law, but
taxpayers are better off finding some textual hooks within the
Code itself on which to hang their case. And Kligfeld has
scanned the Code looking for those hooks. He begins with section
20 At the hearing on the motion, the Commissioner’s counsel
took an extreme view of the application of Rhone-Poulenc:
The Court: The Kligfelds, they take the life-
enhancing serum, they don’t get rid of their
distributed partnership property until 2100. They got
the property in 1999. The IRS says inflated basis,
partnership item, we’re going to issue an FPAA for
1999, even though now it’s January of 2100. Kosher?
IRS Counsel: Yes, I believe that is the case,
your Honor.
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