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would be the general partner with the largest profits interest at
the close of the 1990 taxable year, but section 6226(d)(1) might
again deprive all the 1990 partners of standing.
Kligfeld argues, and not without some force, that there may
be times when reading TEFRA provisions as the Commissioner claims
they should be read might lead to strange scenarios like the
example above--where the issuance of FPAAs followed by
computational adjustments would be unchallengeable by any
partner, past or present. The difficulty with this analysis, as
a matter of statutory interpretation, is that it doesn’t rise to
the level of absurdity:22 In the mill run of cases, the
Commissioner will be challenging partnership returns closer in
time to the partners’ individual returns, and most partnerships
do not have such churning partnership rosters. Kligfeld may not
be wrong in arguing that such an unchecked exercise of the taxing
power would raise a serious question under the due process clause
of the fifth amendment. However, a court should “never * * *
anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the
necessity of deciding it.” United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17,
21 (1960); see also Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng.,
22 Literal applications of a statute which lead to absurd
consequences should be ignored when a different, reasonable
application can be applied which is consistent with legislative
intent. Lastarmco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 810, 826
(1982). But the absurdity must be “so gross as to shock the
general moral or common sense.” Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S.
55, 60 (1930).
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