James G. LeBloch and Cathy Michelsen LeBloch - Page 26




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               We agree with petitioner that all of these disputed items              
          are nontaxable to them and should be reflected as such.  The                
          largest amount, $5,978.83, reflects a business deposit that was             
          mistakenly deposited into Michelsen’s personal account and then             
          contemporaneously transferred to the business account when                  
          Michelsen discovered the mistake.  The next largest amount,                 
          $1,900, reflects funds that were withdrawn by LeBloch and then              
          redeposited into his account.  The $660.50 deposit reflects a               
          reimbursement that NT made to Michelsen.  The remaining five                
          amounts are simply transfers of cash from LeBloch to Michelsen.             
               2.  Loan Repayments                                                    
               Petitioners argue that respondent’s bank deposits analyses             
          for the respective years must be adjusted further to reflect                
          $35,000, $15,000, and $20,000 of nontaxable loan repayments                 
          deposited into one of LeBloch’s financial accounts.  We agree.              
          Case law establishes a two-part test for determining whether a              
          transfer of money qualifies as debt.  First, repayment of the               
          transferred funds cannot be contingent upon a future event.                 
          Second, the transfer must be made with a reasonable expectation,            
          belief, and intent that it be repaid.  See Zimmerman v. United              
          States, 318 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1963); Estate of Trompeter v.                
          Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-35.  Whether a transfer is made               
          with the requisite expectation, belief, and intent is factual.              
          See John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521 (1946).                   







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