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of the Court and “petitioner chose to forego such opportunities
[to move the Court to reopen the record before decision was
entered in the 1989 case], and should not be allowed to set aside
her decision well after the fact”; (2) although section 6015 as
enacted by the 1998 Act provided for administrative remedies,
“nothing in section 6015 indicates that this was intended to be
the sole means to raise section 6015”; (3) res judicata effects
cannot be avoided “simply because a section 6015 claim was not
economically worth her while prior to the Commissioner
promulgating his proposed regulations under the allocation
rules”; and (4) petitioner’s interpretation of the 2-year
election rule would make section 6015(g)(2) into “irrational
surplusage”, because under that interpretation the res judicata
rule could always be avoided.
The parties dispute the significance of our opinions in
Noons v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-243, and Butler v.
Commissioner, 114 T.C. 276 (2000). Petitioner states: “this
court may wish to consider whether Noons (like Butler) is
correctly decided.”
We agree with respondent’s conclusion that petitioner is not
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
V. Conclusions
The Congress chose to provide a statutory rule as to res
judicata in section 6015(e)(3)(B) (under the 1998 Act) and then
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