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The parties agree that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact (Rule 121(b)), but their dispute as to the meaning
of the regulation implies in the instant case a disagreement as
to what are the material facts. However, we are spared the
necessity in the instant case of exploring the nuances of the
regulation and determining which are the material facts and their
consequences.
Whatever may be the precise meaning of the regulation
sentence the parties focus on, that sentence is an interpretation
of the meaningful participation language of section 6015(g)(2).
The parties have stipulated for purposes of this motion as
follows:
11. Petitioner meaningfully participated in the 1989
case within the meaning of I.R.C. § 6015(g)(2).
We understand this stipulation to be an agreement that, whatever
facts are necessary to a conclusion of meaningful participation
under section 6015(g)(2),9 those are the facts in the instant
case. (See supra note 4.) Neither side has asked to be relieved
from the effects of this stipulation. See Rule 91(e) (second
sentence). This stipulation is not plainly in conflict with the
undisputed evidence in the record. Cf. McLaulin v. Commissioner,
9 See, e.g., discussion in Huynh v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2006-180, and cases cited therein.
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