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pending case.” Rule 91(a). Put another way, the stipulation
process requires the “voluntary exchange of necessary facts,
documents, and other data between the parties * * *.” Branerton,
61 T.C. at 692. The process works because the parties are bound
by the stipulations. Rule 91(e). And this means that we “will
not permit a party to a stipulation to qualify, change, or
contradict a stipulation * * * [unless] justice requires.” Id.
With “justice” as our standard, we do have broad discretion
to determine when it is appropriate to set aside a stipulation.
Blohm v. Commissioner, 994 F.2d 1542, 1553 (11th Cir. 1993),
affg. T.C. Memo. 1991-636; Estate of Eddy v. Commissioner, 115
T.C. 135, 137 n.4 (2000). However, our discretion is tempered by
the importance of making stipulations stick--we enforce
stipulations unless not just “injustice,” but “manifest
injustice” would result. See Bokum v. Commissioner, 992 F.2d
1132, 1135-36 (11th Cir. 1993), affg. 94 T.C. 126 (1990).
The Commissioner cites Saigh v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 171,
177 (1956); Bakare v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-72, and
similar cases as additional constraints on our discretion.
In Saigh, 26 T.C. at 177, we restated the general rule that a
“stipulation is in all essential characteristics a mutual
contract by which each party grants to the other a concession of
some rights as a consideration for those secured and the
settlement stipulation is entitled to all of the sanctity of any
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