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other contract.” We do regard settlement stipulations as
contracts, requiring proof of mutual mistake, coercion, duress,
or some other contractual defenses before we would choose not to
enforce them. See, e.g., Korangy v. Commissioner, 893 F.2d 69,
72 (4th Cir. 1990) (unilateral mistake), affg. T.C. Memo. 1989-2;
Saigh, 26 T.C. at 180 (reliance on false representation of the
other party).
But in this case Lovenguth has asked us to set aside only a
“stipulation of fact” drafted in preparation for trial. And, as
we noted in Stamm Intl. Corp. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 315, 321
(1988), “more stringent standards” should be applied to motions
to vacate a settlement agreement than to pretrial stipulations of
fact. We do allow relief from both types under general
principles of contract law, see Mathia v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2007-4; Markin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1989-665, but
the plain language of our rule governing pretrial stipulations--
allowing relief from stipulations if justice requires--allows us
to consider factors that might not be sufficient to upset a
contract.
The most common situation is where the stipulation is
contrary to facts brought out at trial. See Blohm, 994 F.2d at
1553; Jasionowski v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 312, 318 (1976). It
is true that there has been no trial here, but such cases are
still relevant for showing that something less than a contractual
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