-29-
“nonsense”.6 United States v. Tuff, 469 F.3d at 1253. As was
true in the case of the taxpayer there, petitioner exercised her
options and purchased her CTI stock with cash. While the cash
may not have come directly from her assets, but was borrowed from
CIBC Oppenheimer, she was personally liable to CIBC for repayment
of that borrowing. We also note that she owned her CTI stock
after the exercise and had all of the rights of ownership related
thereto.
Apparently seeing the illogic of their just-rejected
argument, petitioners in their petition and in their briefs
expand their position as set forth in the memorandum of law by
arguing that the shares obtained through the exercise of the
stock options were subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture or
were nontransferable due to CTI’s insider trading policy. Most
specifically, petitioners argue, petitioner exercised her options
during the corporate blackout period; thus, they conclude, the
shares were subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture and were
nontransferable until May 17, 2002, the day the restricted
windows under the corporate insider trading policy ended. We
disagree with this argument.
6 This argument has been previously considered and rejected
by this Court and others. See Facq v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2006-111; Hilen v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-226; see also
Palahnuk v. United States, 70 Fed. Cl. 87 (2006), affd. 475 F.3d
1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Facq v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 2d
1288 (W.D. Wash. 2005); Miller v. United States, 345 F. Supp. 2d
1046 (N.D. Cal. 2004), affd. 209 Fed. Appx. 690 (9th Cir. 2006).
Page: Previous 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 Next
Last modified: November 10, 2007