Thomas J. and Bonnie F. Ratke - Page 20




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          investigator would not be permitted to testify.  United States v.           
          Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 229 (1975).  The Supreme Court held that              
          the trial “court’s preclusion sanction was an entirely proper               
          method of assuring compliance with its [disclosure] order.”  Id.            
          at 241.                                                                     
               In Hartz Mountain Industries v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. at               
          528, we ruled as follows:                                                   
                    Finally, petitioner has waived the work product                   
               doctrine by making a “testimonial use” of work product                 
               materials.  See In re Sealed Case, supra at 817-818;                   
               Coleco Industries, Inc. v. Universal City Studios,                     
               supra at 691.  Petitioner submitted affidavits from its                
               in-house counsel to support its internal position with                 
               respect to the antitrust litigation.  By offering this                 
               selective disclosure of work product to establish its                  
               intent, petitioner has waived all work product                         
               protection relevant to the same issue, and fairness                    
               requires discovery of all work product that pertains to                
               petitioner’s antitrust settlement intentions.  Coleco                  
               Industries, Inc. v. Universal City Studios, supra.                     
          Thus, although partial disclosure is not necessarily fatal to a             
          claim of work product doctrine privilege, a “testimonial use” of            
          the disclosed material may result in a conclusion that in                   
          fairness the related material must be disclosed even though it              
          would otherwise be protected from disclosure.9                              




               9 This has some similarity to Fed. R. Evid. 106, under which           
          a party may interrupt another party’s presentation in order to              
          require “the introduction at that time” of certain evidence                 
          “which ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with”           
          the other party’s evidence.                                                 






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