Paul Marcillese Shelton and Felicia Laverne Graham - Page 9




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          some point in the future, it was not intended by the parties to             
          function as a substitute for the waiver itself and, regardless of           
          intent, is not sufficient to serve that purpose.  See Brissett v.           
          Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-310.                                          
               Because the consent order does not meet the requirements of            
          section 152(e)(2) and the applicable regulation, it does not                
          qualify as an effective release of Clark’s entitlement to claim             
          the dependency exemption for the child.  Because petitioners are            
          not entitled to claim the child as a dependent for Federal income           
          tax purposes, they do not satisfy the “qualifying child”                    
          requirements of the child tax credit under section 24 with                  
          respect to the child and are not entitled to the child tax credit           
          claimed with respect to that child for the year in issue.  See              
          sec. 24(c)(1); Smith v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-163.                  
               Because of respondent’s concession that petitioners may                
          claim dependency exemption deductions and associated child tax              
          credits with respect to petitioners’ other three children,                  

                                                  Decision will be entered            
                                             under Rule 155.                          














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