- 8 -
the Code.”); Dodge v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-236 (finding
that petitioner was “incorrect” insofar as he argued that
respondent could not impose additions to tax pursuant to sections
6651(a)(1) and 6654(a) because Form 1040 does not comply with the
PRA); see also Salberg v. United States, 969 F.2d 379, 384 (7th
Cir. 1992) (“Statutes are not subject to the PRA and, as the
government points out in its brief, every court that has
considered the argument that the regulations and the instruction
books promulgated by the IRS are within the scope of the PRA has
rejected it.”); United States v. Dawes, 951 F.2d 1189, 1193 (10th
Cir. 1991) (“Congress enacted the PRA to keep agencies, including
the IRS, from deluging the public with needless paperwork. It did
not do so to create a loophole in the tax code.”); United States
v. Hicks, 947 F.2d 1356, 1359 (9th Cir. 1991) (“But even assuming
without deciding that the IRS failed to comply with the PRA here,
its failure does not prevent Hicks from being penalized.”).8
8 Petitioner relies heavily on the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit’s unpublished decision in Pond v. Commissioner, 211
Fed. Appx. 749 (10th Cir. 2007), affg. T.C. Memo. 2005-255, in
support of his argument regarding the PRA. An appeal in this
case would normally lie in the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, absent a stipulation to the contrary. The Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in Pond, never reached the merits
of the taxpayer’s argument because the taxpayer did not include
any of the Form 1040 in the record for the Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit to review. See id. at 752 n.2. Moreover, the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit noted that “while the
[Form] 1040 is an information request, it might be excepted from
the provisions of * * * [the PRA, 44 U.S.C. sec. 3512] under the
statutory origin theory discussed but neither adopted nor
(continued...)
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