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in his investment, even if he is an investor in the
same project as a taxpayer who has not yet paid in his
investment.
Hence, limiting the exemption to investors who
have not yet paid in over 50% of their investments
reflects a purpose antithetical to our system of juris-
prudence, that is, perpetuating a fraud by having the
government pay a further portion of the consideration
it promised to persons who had not yet completed their
performance in reliance on the government’s promised
consideration to the persons who had already fully
performed in reliance upon the government promise.
[Reproduced literally.]
In order to prevail on his equal protection argument,
petitioner must show that the transitional rule was not premised
upon a rational basis, see Regan v. Taxation With Representation,
461 U.S. 540, 547-548 (1983), and instead was premised upon an
impermissible basis such as race, religion, or the desire to
prevent the exercise of petitioner’s constitutional rights, see
United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974).
We reject petitioner’s argument that the transitional rule
violates his equal protection rights under the Due Process
Clause. In enacting section 469, Congress considered whether any
relief from the application of section 469(a) was appropriate.
After giving consideration to that question, Congress decided to
provide in the transitional rule certain relief, but only for
certain taxable years, to certain taxpayers in certain circum-
stances.9
9Congress also decided to provide in sec. 469(m) certain
(continued...)
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