-24-
20.2055-2(b)(1), but by section 20.2055-2(c). All disclaimers
are by definition executed after a decedent’s death, but under
section 2518 the transfer that a qualified disclaimer triggers
relates back to the date of death, and the interest disclaimed
passes as if it had been a bequest in the decedent’s will. As
we’ve already noted, see supra note 9, the disclaimer regulation
characterizes the property going directly to the Foundation as a
qualified disclaimer of an "undivided portion of an interest"
because Hamilton didn’t keep any remainder interest. See sec.
2518(c)(1); sec. 25.2518-3(b), Gift Tax Regs.
The Commissioner argues, however, that the increased
charitable deduction like the one the estate is claiming here--
for “such value [as has through settlement been] finally
determined for federal estate tax purposes”--is contingent not
just because it depended on a disclaimer, but because it occurred
only because the IRS examined the estate’s return and challenged
the fair market value of its assets. We disagree. The
regulation speaks of the contingency of “a transfer” of property
passing to charity. The transfer of property to the Foundation
in this case is not contingent on any event that occurred after
Christiansen’s death (other than the execution of the disclaimer)
--it remains 25 percent of the total estate in excess of
$6,350,000. That the estate and the IRS bickered about the value
of the property being transferred doesn’t mean the transfer
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