Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 8 (1991)

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136

ARDESTANI v. INS

Opinion of the Court

intent is clearly expressed. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U. S. 421, 432, n. 12 (1987); Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 102, 108 (1980). In this case, the legislative history cannot overcome the strong presumption " 'that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used.' " American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U. S. 63, 68 (1982) (quoting Richards v. United States, 369 U. S. 1, 9 (1962)). While it is possible, as Ardestani contends, that Congress' only intent in defining adversary adjudications was to limit EAJA fees to trial-type proceedings in which the Government is represented, Congress chose to refer to adversary adjudications "under section 554." Section 554 does not merely describe a type of agency proceeding; it also prescribes that certain procedures be followed in the adjudications that fall within its scope. We must assume that the EAJA's unqualified reference to a specific statutory provision mandating specific procedural protections is more than a general indication of the types of proceedings that the EAJA was intended to cover.

We are unable to identify any conclusive statement in the legislative history regarding Congress' decision to define adversary adjudications under the EAJA by reference to § 554, much less one that would undermine the ordinary understanding of the phrase "under section 554." It is not enough that the House Conference Committee Report on the EAJA states, without further comment, that adversary adjudications are "defined under" the APA. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 96-1434, p. 23 (1980). Although it is conceivable that "defined under" means that Congress intended adversary adjudications covered by the EAJA to be those "as defined by" the APA, it could just as easily mean that covered adjudications are "defined as those conducted under" the APA. We are similarly unpersuaded that Congress meant to institute a substantive, rather than a semantic, change when, without

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