Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 9 (1991)

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Cite as: 502 U. S. 129 (1991)

Opinion of the Court

explanation, it changed the draft section of the EAJA defining "adversary adjudication" from "an adjudication subject to section 554," S. Rep. No. 96-253, p. 24 (1979) (emphasis added), to "an adjudication under section 554."

Our conclusion that any ambiguities in the legislative history are insufficient to undercut the ordinary understanding of the statutory language is reinforced in this case by the limited nature of waivers of sovereign immunity. The EAJA renders the United States liable for attorney's fees for which it would not otherwise be liable, and thus amounts to a partial waiver of sovereign immunity. Any such waiver must be strictly construed in favor of the United States. Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U. S. 310, 318 (1986); Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U. S. 680, 685-686 (1983).

Because we conclude that administrative immigration proceedings do not fall "under section 554" and therefore are wholly outside the scope of the EAJA, this case is distinguishable from those cases in which we have recognized that, once Congress has waived sovereign immunity over certain subject matter, the Court should be careful not to "assume the authority to narrow the waiver that Congress intended." United States v. Kubrick, 444 U. S. 111, 118 (1979); see, e. g., Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89, 95 (1990) ("Once Congress has made such a waiver, we think that making the rule of equitable tolling applicable to suits against the Government, in the same way that it is applicable to private suits, amounts to little, if any, broadening of the congressional waiver"); Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U. S. 877, 892 (1989) (holding that Social Security administrative proceedings held on remand from a district court order "are an integral part of the 'civil action' for judicial review," and thus that attorney's fees for representation on remand are available under the civil action provisions of the EAJA, 28 U. S. C. § 2412).

Finally, we consider Ardestani's argument that a functional interpretation of the EAJA is necessary in order to

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