Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 17 (1992)

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Cite as: 503 U. S. 159 (1992)

Thomas, J., dissenting

v. State, 518 So. 2d 1186, 1188 (Miss. 1987) (membership in a church); Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 236, 731 P. 2d 192, 231 (1986) (same); Deputy v. State, 500 A. 2d 581, 598 (Del. 1985) (religious rebirth); People v. Belmontes, 45 Cal. 3d 744, 797, 755 P. 2d 310, 340 (1988) (same); Evans v. McCotter, 790 F. 2d 1232, 1242, and n. 10 (CA5 1986) (conversion to Christianity); State v. Beuke, 38 Ohio St. 3d 29, 43, 526 N. E. 2d 274, 289 (1988) (former membership in the Cub Scouts). I see no way to hold that this evidence has relevance, but that Dawson's gang membership does not.

A double standard for determining relevance may distort the picture presented to the jury. In this case, Dawson himself chose to introduce evidence of certain good character traits. Unless the State had responded with evidence of other, bad traits, the jury could not possibly have made a fair and balanced determination. Membership in Alcoholics Anonymous might suggest a good character, but membership in the Aryan Brotherhood just as surely suggests a bad one. The jury could not have assessed Dawson's overall character without both.

Just last Term, in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808 (1991), the Court condemned a similar distortion. Overruling Booth v. Maryland, 482 U. S. 496 (1987), and South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U. S. 805 (1989), we held that the Eighth Amendment does not generally prohibit the introduction of victim impact evidence. See Payne, supra, at 827. We reasoned that allowing the jury to consider the defendant, but not the victim, would create an unbalanced picture. Quoting a dissenting opinion in Booth, we stated: " '[T]he State has a legitimate interest in counteracting the mitigating evidence which the defendant is entitled to put in, by reminding the sentencer that just as the murderer should be considered as an individual, so too the victim is an individual whose death represents a unique loss to society and in particular to his family.' " Payne, supra, at 825 (quoting Booth, 482 U. S., at 517 (White, J., dissenting)); see also 482 U. S., at 520

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