226
Opinion of the Court
aggravating factors as defined in the jury instructions, and for the most part following the statutory wording, were:
"1. The Defendant contemplated that life would be taken and/or the capital murder was intentionally committed and that the Defendant was engaged in an attempt to commit a robbery; and was committed for pecuniary gain.
"2. The capital murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing the detection and lawful arrest of James R. Stringer, the Defendant.
"3. The capital murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel." Brief for Respondents 4.
The trial court in its instructions did not further define the meaning of the third factor.
On direct review the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. Stringer v. State, supra. With respect to the sentence, the court found it was not "imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor," id., at 478; "the evidence fully support[ed] the jury's finding of statutorily required aggravating circumstances," id., at 479; and the death sentence was not disproportionate to sentences imposed in other cases, ibid. Petitioner's conviction became final when we denied certiorari on February 19, 1985. Stringer v. Mississippi, 469 U. S. 1230. Postconviction relief was denied in the state courts. Stringer v. State, 485 So. 2d 274 (1986).
This case comes to us from proceedings begun when petitioner filed his first federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The relevant claim is petitioner's contention that the third aggravating factor found by the jury and considered in the sentencing proceeding, the "heinous, atrocious or cruel" aggravating factor, was so vague as to render the sentence arbitrary, in violation of the Eighth Amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishment. The District Court found the claim subject to a procedural bar and, in the alter-
Page: Index Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 NextLast modified: October 4, 2007