Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 6 (1992)

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Cite as: 503 U. S. 222 (1992)

Opinion of the Court

native, ruled it had no merit. Stringer v. Scroggy, 675 F. Supp. 356, 366 (1987).

Without consideration of the procedural bar question, the

Court of Appeals affirmed on the merits, finding no constitutional infirmity in the jury's consideration of the third aggravating factor because two other aggravating factors were un-challenged. Stringer v. Jackson, 862 F. 2d 1108 (CA5 1988). When the Court of Appeals affirmed, we had not decided Clemons v. Mississippi, and we later vacated its opinion for further consideration. 494 U. S. 1074 (1990). On remand the Court of Appeals held that petitioner was not entitled to rely on Clemons or the related case of Maynard v. Cart-wright in his habeas corpus proceeding because those decisions announced a new rule after his sentence was final. 909 F. 2d 111 (1990). The court relied upon its earlier analysis in Smith v. Black, 904 F. 2d 950 (1990), cert. pending, No. 90-1164, a case that had also presented the question whether Clemons and Maynard announced a new rule. We granted certiorari, 500 U. S. 915 (1991), and now reverse.

II

Subject to two exceptions, a case decided after a petitioner's conviction and sentence became final may not be the predicate for federal habeas corpus relief unless the decision was dictated by precedent existing when the judgment in question became final. Butler v. McKellar, 494 U. S. 407 (1990); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302 (1989); Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989). As we explained in Butler, "[t]he 'new rule' principle . . . validates reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents made by state courts even though they are shown to be contrary to later decisions." 494 U. S., at 414. Neither one of the exceptions is at issue here, so our inquiry is confined to the question whether Clemons, Maynard, or both announced a new rule.

When a petitioner seeks federal habeas relief based upon a principle announced after a final judgment, Teague and our

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