348
Syllabus
be analyzed in detail, in light of the entire legislative enactment, to determine whether the language in question created rights within the meaning of § 1983. Pp. 355-357. (b) Congress did not unambiguously confer upon the Act's benefici-aries the right to enforce the "reasonable efforts" requirement. The Act is mandatory only insofar as it requires a State to have an approved plan containing the listed features; and it is undisputed that the Illinois plan provides that reasonable efforts at prevention and reunification will be made. Respondents err in basing their § 1983 argument, in part, on § 671(a)(3)'s "in effect" language, which is directed to the requirement that the plan apply to all of a State's political subdivisions and is not intended to otherwise modify the word "plan." Unlike the Medicaid legislation in Wilder, supra—which actually required the States to adopt reasonable and adequate reimbursement rates for health care providers and which, along with regulations, set forth in some detail the factors to be considered in determining the methods for calculating rates—here, the statute provides no further guidance as to how "reasonable efforts" are to be measured, and, within broad limits, lets the State decide how to comply with the directive. Since other sections of the Act provide mechanisms for the Secretary to enforce the "reasonable efforts" clause, the absence of a § 1983 remedy does not make the clause a dead letter. The regulations also are not specific and provide no notice that failure to do anything other than submit a plan with the requisite features is a further condition on the receipt of federal funds. And the legislative history indicates that the Act left a great deal of discretion to the States to meet the "reasonable efforts" requirement. Pp. 358-363. 2. The Act does not create an implied cause of action for private enforcement. Respondents have failed to demonstrate that Congress intended to make such a remedy available. See Cort, supra; Trans-america Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U. S. 11, 15-16. Pp. 363-364.
917 F. 2d 980, reversed.
Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Black-mun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, J., joined, post, p. 364.
Christina M. Tchen, Special Assistant Attorney General of Illinois, argued the cause for petitioners. With her on
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