Cite as: 503 U. S. 347 (1992)
Blackmun, J., dissenting
dren in this case may not enforce the State's commitment in federal court either under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 or under the Act itself.
In my view, the Court's conclusion is plainly inconsistent with this Court's decision just two Terms ago in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Assn., 496 U. S. 498 (1990), in which we found enforceable under § 1983 a functionally identical provision of the Medicaid Act requiring "reasonable" reimbursements to health-care providers. More troubling still, the Court reaches its conclusion without even stating, much less applying, the principles our precedents have used to determine whether a statute has created a right enforceable under § 1983. I cannot acquiesce in this unexplained disregard for established law. Accordingly, I dissent.
I
A
Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities, secured by the Constitution and laws" of the United States. We recognized in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1 (1980), that § 1983 provides a cause of action for violations of federal statutes, not just the Constitution. Since Thiboutot, we have recognized two general exceptions to this rule. First, no cause of action will lie where the statute in question does not " 'create enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities within the meaning of § 1983.' " Wilder, 496 U. S., at 508 (quoting Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479 U. S. 418, 423 (1987)). Second, § 1983 is unavailable where "Congress has foreclosed such enforcement of the statute in the enactment itself." 496 U. S., at 508.
In determining the scope of the first exception—whether a federal statute creates an "enforceable right"—the Court has developed and repeatedly applied a three-part test. We have asked (1) whether the statutory provision at issue " 'was intend[ed] to benefit the putative plaintiff.' " Id., at
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