Cite as: 503 U. S. 607 (1992)
Syllabus
contention that the proviso's "arising under federal law" modifier is broad enough to include penalties prescribed by EPA-approved state statutes supplanting the CWA is answered by this Court's interpretation of the phrase "arising under" federal law in 28 U. S. C. § 1331 to exclude cases in which the plaintiff relies on state law, even when the State's exercise of power in the particular circumstances is expressly permitted by federal law, see, e. g., Gully v. First Nat. Bank in Meridian, 299 U. S. 109, 116, and by the probability that Congress adopted the same interpretation of "arising under federal law" here, see, e. g., ICC v. Locomotive Engineers, 482 U. S. 270, 284-285. The plain language of the "civil penalties arising under federal law" phrase suggests an apparently expansive, but uncertain, waiver that is in tension with the clear waiver for coercive fines evinced in § 1323(a)'s antecedent text; that tension is resolved by the requirement that any statement of waiver be unequivocal and the rule that waivers be narrowly construed. Pp. 623-627. (e) RCRA's federal-facilities section—which, in relevant part, subjects the Government to "all . . . State . . . requirements, both substantive and procedural (including any requirement for permits or reporting or any provisions for injunctive relief and such sanctions as may be imposed by a court to enforce such relief)," and provides that the United States "shall [not] be immune . . . from any process or sanction of any . . . Court with respect to the enforcement of any such injunctive relief"—is most reasonably interpreted as including substantive standards and the coercive means for implementing those standards, but excluding punitive measures. All of the textual indications of the kinds of requirements meant to bind the Government refer either to mechanisms requiring review for substantive compliance (permit and reporting requirements) or to mechanisms for enforcing substantive compliance in the future (injunctive relief and sanctions to enforce it), in stark contrast to the statute's failure to mention any mechanism for penalizing past violations. Moreover, the fact that the only specific reference to an enforcement mechanism in the provision's final sentence describes "sanction" as a coercive means of injunctive enforcement bars any inference that a waiver of immunity from "requirements" somehow extends to punitive fines that are never so much as mentioned. Pp. 627-628.
904 F. 2d 1058, reversed and remanded.
Souter, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Part II-C, and the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II-A, II-B, and III, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. White, J., filed an opinion concurring in
609
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