Cite as: 503 U. S. 607 (1992)
Opinion of the Court
II
We start with a common rule, with which we presume congressional familiarity, see McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U. S. 479, 496 (1991), that any waiver of the National Government's sovereign immunity must be unequivocal, see United States v. Mitchell, 445 U. S. 535, 538-539 (1980). "Waivers of immunity must be 'construed strictly in favor of the sovereign,' McMahon v. United States, 342 U. S. 25, 27 (1951), and not 'enlarge[d] . . . beyond what the language requires.' Eastern Transportation Co. v. United States, 272 U. S. 675, 686 (1927)." Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U. S. 680, 685-686 (1983). By these lights we examine first the two statutes' citizen-suit sections, which can be treated together because their relevant provisions are similar, then the CWA's federal-facilities section, and, finally, the corresponding section of RCRA.
A
So far as it concerns us, the CWA's citizen-suit section reads that
"any citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf—
"(1) against any person (including . . . the United States . . .) who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard or limitation . . . .
. . . . . "The district courts shall have jurisdiction . . . to enforce such an effluent standard or limitation, or such an order . . . as the case may be, and to apply any appro-Court of Appeals appears to have considered whether RCRA's citizen-suit section constitutes such a waiver.
615
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