Cite as: 504 U. S. 71 (1992)
Kennedy, J., dissenting
confinement, its decision is without authority, and most of its opinion is nothing more than confusing dicta.
I submit that today's decision is unwarranted and unwise. I share the Court's concerns about the risks inherent in requiring a committed person to prove what can often be imprecise, but as Justice Thomas observes in his dissent, this is not a case in which the period of confinement exceeds the gravity of the offense or in which there are reasons to believe the release proceedings are pointless or a sham. Post, at 114, n. 10. Petitioner has been incarcerated for less than one-third the statutory maximum for the offenses proved by the State. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 14:60 (aggravated burglary) and 14:94 (illegal use of a weapon) (West 1986). In light of these facts, the majority's repeated reference to "indefinite detention," with apparent reference to the potential duration of confinement, and not its lack of a fixed end point, has no bearing on this case. See ante, at 77, n. 4, 82, 83, n. 6; cf. ante, at 77, n. 4 (curious suggestion that confinement has been extended beyond an initial term of years). It is also significant to observe that this is not a case in which the incarcerated subject has demonstrated his nondangerousness. Within the two months before his release hearing, petitioner had been sent to a maximum security section of the Feliciana Forensic Facility because of altercations with another patient. 563 So. 2d, at 1141. Further, there is evidence in the record which suggests that petitioner's initial claim of insanity may have been feigned. The medical panel that reviewed petitioner's request for release stated that "there is no evidence of mental illness," and indeed that there was "never any evidence of mental illness or disease since admission." App. 10. In sum, it would be difficult to conceive of a less compelling situation for the imposition of sweeping new constitutional commands such as the majority imposes today.
Because the majority conflates the standards for civil and criminal commitment, treating this criminal case as though
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