Cite as: 504 U. S. 158 (1992)
Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting
was recognizing a "defense" or an "immunity." Compare 386 U. S., at 556 (criticizing Court of Appeals for concluding that no "immunity" was available), with id., at 557 (recognizing a good-faith "defense"). Any initial ambiguity, however, has certainly been eliminated by subsequent cases; there can be no doubt that it is a qualified immunity to which the officer is entitled. See Malley, supra, at 340. Similarly, in Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308, 318 (1975), we recognized that, "[a]lthough there have been differing emphases and formulations of the common-law immunity," the general recognition under state law that public officers are entitled to a good-faith defense was sufficient to support the recognition of a § 1983 immunity.
Thus, unlike the Court, I think our prior precedent establishes that a demonstration that a good-faith defense was available at the time § 1983 was adopted does, in fact, provide substantial support for a contemporary defendant claiming that he is entitled to qualified immunity in the analogous § 1983 context. While we refuse to recognize a common-law immunity if § 1983's history or purpose counsel against applying it, ante, at 164, I see no such history or purpose that would so counsel here.
Indeed, I am at a loss to understand what is accomplished by today's decision—other than a needlessly fastidious adherence to nomenclature—given that the Court acknowledges that a good-faith defense will be available for respondents to assert on remand. Respondents presumably will be required to show the traditional elements of a good-faith defense—either that they acted without malice or that they acted with probable cause. See n. 1, supra; Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U. S. 187, 194 (1879); W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 120, p. 854 (4th ed. 1971). The first element, "maliciousness," encompasses an inquiry into subjective intent for bringing the suit. Stewart, supra, at 192-193; Prosser, supra, § 120, at 855. This quite often includes an inquiry into the defendant's subjective belief as to whether he be-
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