Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 38 (1992)

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1040

LUCAS v. SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL

Blackmun, J., dissenting

force it." Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U. S. 470, 491-492 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id., at 488-489, and n. 18. The Court consistently has upheld regulations imposed to arrest a signifi-cant threat to the common welfare, whatever their economic effect on the owner. See, e. g., Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U. S. 590, 592-593 (1962); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U. S. 603, 608 (1927); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623 (1887).

Petitioner never challenged the legislature's findings that a building ban was necessary to protect property and life. Nor did he contend that the threatened harm was not sufficiently serious to make building a house in a particular location a "harmful" use, that the legislature had not made sufficient findings, or that the legislature was motivated by anything other than a desire to minimize damage to coastal areas. Indeed, petitioner objected at trial that evidence as to the purposes of the setback requirement was irrelevant. Tr. 68. The South Carolina Supreme Court accordingly understood petitioner not to contest the State's position that "discouraging new construction in close proximity to the beach/dune area is necessary to prevent a great public harm," 304 S. C. 376, 383, 404 S. E. 2d 895, 898 (1991), and "to prevent serious injury to the community." Id., at 387, 404 S. E. 2d, at 901. The court considered itself "bound by these uncontested legislative findings . . . [in the absence of] any attack whatsoever on the statutory scheme." Id., at 383, 404 S. E. 2d, at 898.

Nothing in the record undermines the General Assembly's assessment that prohibitions on building in front of the setback line are necessary to protect people and property from storms, high tides, and beach erosion. Because that legislative determination cannot be disregarded in the absence of such evidence, see, e. g., Euclid, 272 U. S., at 388; O'Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U. S. 251, 257-258 (1931) (Brandeis, J.), and because its determination

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