Cite as: 505 U. S. 1003 (1992)
Blackmun, J., dissenting
final decision would have been to alter the setback line, eliminating the construction ban on Lucas' property.
That petitioner's property fell within the critical area as initially interpreted by the Council does not excuse petitioner's failure to challenge the Act's application to his property in the administrative process. The claim is not ripe until petitioner seeks a variance from that status. "[W]e have made it quite clear that the mere assertion of regulatory jurisdiction by a governmental body does not constitute a regulatory taking." United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U. S. 121, 126 (1985). See also Williamson County, 473 U. S., at 188 (claim not ripe because respondent did not seek variances that would have allowed it to develop the property, notwithstanding the commission's finding that the plan did not comply with the zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations).5
Even if I agreed with the Court that there were no jurisdictional barriers to deciding this case, I still would not try to decide it. The Court creates its new takings jurisprudence based on the trial court's finding that the property
5 Even more baffling, given its decision, just a few days ago, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555 (1992), the Court decides petitioner has demonstrated injury in fact. In his complaint, petitioner made no allegations that he had any definite plans for using his property. App. to Pet. for Cert. 153-156. At trial, Lucas testified that he had house plans drawn up, but that he was "in no hurry" to build "because the lot was appreciating in value." Tr. 28-29. The trial court made no findings of fact that Lucas had any plans to use the property from 1988 to 1990. " '[S]ome day' intentions—without any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some day will be—do not support a finding of the 'actual or imminent' injury that our cases require." 504 U. S., at 564. The Court circumvents Defenders of Wildlife by deciding to resolve this case as if it arrived on the pleadings alone. But it did not. Lucas had a full trial on his claim for " 'damages for the temporary taking of his property' from the date of the 1988 Act's passage to 'such time as this matter is finally resolved,' " ante, at 1013, n. 3, quoting the complaint, and failed to demonstrate any immediate concrete plans to build or sell.
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