Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 40 (1992)

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372

SAWYER v. WHITLEY

Stevens, J., concurring in judgment

Unlike the standard suggested by the Court, this standard acknowledges both the "aggravation" and "mitigation" aspects of capital-punishment law. It recognizes that, in the extraordinary case, constitutional error may have precluded consideration of mitigating circumstances so substantial as to warrant a court's review of a defaulted, successive, or abusive claim. It also recognizes that, again in the extraordinary case, constitutional error may have inaccurately demonstrated aggravating circumstances so substantial as to warrant review of a defendant's claims.

Moreover, the "clearly-erroneous" standard is duly protective of the State's legitimate interests in finality and respectful of the systemic and institutional costs of successive habeas litigation. The standard is stringent: If the sentence "is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety" it is not clearly erroneous "even though [the court is] convinced that had it been sitting as the [sentencer], it would have weighed the evidence differently." Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U. S. 564, 574 (1985). At the same time, "clearly-erroneous" review allows a federal court to entertain a defaulted claim in the rare case in which the "court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U. S. 364, 395 (1948).

Finally, the "clearly-erroneous" standard is workable. As was true of the cause-and-prejudice standard adopted in Mc-Cleskey v. Zant, the clear-error standard is "[w]ell-defined in the case law [and] familiar to federal courts. . . . The standard is an objective one, and can be applied in a manner that com-ports with the threshold nature of the abuse of the writ inquiry." 499 U. S., at 496. Federal courts have long applied the "clearly-erroneous" standard pursuant to Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and have done so "in civil contempt actions, condemnation proceedings, copyright appeals, [and] forfeiture actions for illegal activity." 1 S. Childress & M. Davis, Standards of Review § 2.3, pp. 29-30

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