Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 24 (1992)

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492

ESTATE OF COWART v. NICKLOS DRILLING CO.

Blackmun, J., dissenting

Court of Appeals, was inconsistent with the Act's plain meaning.

II

This Court today agrees with the Director's postcertiorari position that Cowart's claim for compensation is barred by the "clear meaning" of the statute "as written." Ante, at 476. According to the Court, Cowart is plainly a "person entitled to compensation" within the meaning of § 33(g)(1), and his failure to obtain Nicklos' written approval of his third-party settlement requires, by the "plain language" of § 33(g), that he be deemed to have forfeited his statutory benefits. Although the Court does not identify any plausible statutory purpose whatsoever advanced by its reading, and although—to its credit—it acknowledges the "harsh effects" of its interpretation, ante, at 483, the Court ultimately concludes that the language of § 33 compels it to reject Cowart's position.

In my view, the language of § 33 in no way compels the Court to deny Cowart's claim. In fact, the Court's reliance on the Act's "plain language," ante, at 475, is selective: as discussed below, analysis of §§ 33(b) and (f) of the Act shows that, even leaving aside the question whether Cowart is a "person entitled to compensation," a consistently literal interpretation of the Act's language would not require Cowart to have obtained Nicklos' written approval of the settlement. Indeed, under a thoroughgoing "plain meaning" approach, Cowart would be entitled to receive full LHWCA benefits in addition to his third-party settlement, not just the excess of his statutory benefits over the settlement.

At the same time, a consistently literal interpretation of the Act would commit the Court to positions it might be unwilling to take. The conclusion I draw is not that the Court should adopt a purely literal interpretation of the Act, but instead that the Court should recognize, as it has until today, that the LHWCA must be read in light of the purposes and policies it would serve. Once that point is recog-

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