494
Blackmun, J., dissenting
under any award. Thus, he does not come within the "plain meaning" of subsection (f), and, accordingly, for the reasons given above, he would not be bound by the subsection (g)(1) written-approval requirement. It would also follow that, because Nicklos indisputably received the notice required by subsection (g)(2), that provision would not bar Cowart from receiving LHWCA compensation and medical benefits.
Indeed, if Cowart is not covered by subsection (f), he would appear to have been eligible for a larger award than he sought. Subsection (f) does not authorize compensation otherwise unavailable; instead, it operates as a limit, in the specified circumstances, on the employer's LHWCA liability. If read literally, subsection (f) would not bar Cowart from receiving full LHWCA benefits, in addition to the amount he received in settlement of the third-party claim.
It is true that § 33(f) has not always been read literally. Subsection (f) has been assumed to be applicable where, for example, the claimant's third-party suit was filed after an employer voluntarily began paying LHWCA compensation, not just where compensation was paid pursuant to an award. See, e. g., I. T. O. Corp. of Baltimore v. Sellman, 954 F. 2d 239, 240, 243-245 (CA4 1992); Shellman v. United States Lines, Inc., 528 F. 2d 675, 678-679, n. 2 (CA9 1975) (referring to the availability of an employer's lien, where the employer has paid compensation without an award, as "judicially created" rather than statutory), cert. denied, 425 U. S. 936 (1976). That interpretation is eminently sensible and consistent with the statutory purpose of encouraging employers to make payments "promptly," directly," and "without an award." See § 14(a). A contrary interpretation would penalize employers who acknowledge liability and commence payments without seeking an award, and it would reward employers who, whether in good faith or bad, contest their liability until faced with a formal award. See Shellman, 528 F. 2d, at 679, n. 2 ("The purpose of this Act would be frustrated if a different result could be reached merely because
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