Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 93 (1993)

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Cite as: 506 U. S. 263 (1993)

O'Connor, J., dissenting

Ante, at 273 (discussing Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 297 (1980)). Rather, this case is about whether a private conspiracy to deprive members of a protected class of legally protected interests gives rise to a federal cause of action. In my view, it does, because that is precisely the sort of conduct that the 42d Congress sought to address in the legislation now codified at § 1985(3). Our precedents construing the scope of gender discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment should not distract us from properly interpreting the scope of the statutory remedy.

II

The second reason the majority offers for reversing the decision below is that petitioners' activities did not intentionally deprive the clinics and their clients of a right guaranteed against private impairment, a requirement that the Court previously has grafted onto the first clause of § 1985(3). See Carpenters, 463 U. S., at 833. I find it unnecessary to address the merits of this argument, however, as I am content to rest my analysis solely on the basis that respondents are entitled to invoke the protections of a federal court under the second clause of § 1985(3). Whereas the first clause of the statute speaks of conspiracies whose purpose is to "depriv[e], either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws," the second clause addresses conspiracies aimed at "preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws."

Respondents attempted to brief the issue for the Court in a supplemental brief on reargument, but the effort was rejected by a majority of the Court. See 505 U. S. 1240 (1992). Although the issue is open to be decided on remand, I agree with Justice Stevens that "[r]espondents have unquestionably established a claim under the second clause of § 1985(3),

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