Cite as: 506 U. S. 461 (1993)
Thomas, J., concurring
in two of the present cases, the rape of white women by Negroes, the relationship is almost uncontrovertible").5
In the end, Justice Douglas and the other Members of the Court concluded that "[w]e cannot say from facts disclosed in these records that these defendants were sentenced to death because they were black." Furman, 408 U. S., at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring). See id., at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("racial discrimination has not been proved"). The Court focused more generally on the uncontrolled discretion placed in judges and juries. Such unbridled discretion, it was argued, practically invited sentencers to vent their personal prejudices in deciding the fate of the accused. See Brief for Petitioner in Furman v. Georgia, O. T. 1971, No. 69-5003, p. 12 ("The jury knew nothing else about the man they sentenced, except his age and race"). "Under these laws no standards govern the selection of the penalty. People live or die, dependent on the whim of one man or of 12." 408 U. S., at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Stewart observed that "the petitioners are among a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed," and concluded that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate sentencing procedures that allow the penalty to be "so wantonly and so freakishly" inflicted. Id., at 309-310 (concurring opinion). The practice of delegating unguided authority—a practice "largely motivated by the desire to mitigate the harshness
5 The Federal Government later acknowledged before this Court that in 11 Southern States between 1945 and 1965, "[t]he data revealed that among all those convicted of rape, blacks were selected disproportionately for the death sentence." App. to Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Gregg v. Georgia, O. T. 1975, No. 74-6257, p. 4a. Furthermore, the Government stated, "we do not question [the] conclusion that during the 20 years in question, in southern states, there was discrimination in rape cases." Id., at 5a. We eventually struck down the death penalty for convicted rapists under the Eighth Amendment, not on the basis of discriminatory application, but as an excessive and disproportionate punishment. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U. S. 584 (1977).
483
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