Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 30 (1993)

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490

GRAHAM v. COLLINS

Thomas, J., concurring

Therefore, although it is said that Lockett and Eddings represent an "about-face" and "a return to the pre-Furman days," Lockett, supra, at 622, 623 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in judgments), there was at root a logical—if by now attenuated—connection between the rationalizing principle of Furman and the prophylactic rule of Eddings. Eddings protects the accused's opportunity to "appris[e]" the jury of his version of the information relevant to the sentencing decision. Our early mitigating cases may thus be read as doing little more than safeguarding the adversary process in sentencing proceedings by conferring on the defendant an affirmative right to place his relevant evidence before the sentencer. See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U. S. 1, 4 (1986). Cf. id., at 5, n. 1 (comparing Eddings with "the elemental due process requirement that a defendant not be sentenced to death 'on the basis of information which he had no opportunity to deny or explain.' Gardner v. Florida, 430 U. S. 349, 362 (1977)").

Consistent with this (admittedly narrow) reading, I would describe Eddings as a kind of rule of evidence: It governs the admissibility of proffered evidence but does not purport to define the substantive standards or criteria that sentencers are to apply in considering the facts. By requiring that sentencers be allowed to "consider" all "relevant" mitigating circumstances, we cannot mean that the decision whether to impose the death penalty must be based upon all of the defendant's evidence, or that such evidence must be considered the way the defendant wishes. Nor can we mean to say that circumstances are necessarily relevant for constitutional purposes if they have any conceivable mitigating value. Such an application of Eddings would eclipse the primary imperative of Furman—that the State define the relevant sentencing criteria and provide rational "standards to guide [the sentencer's] use" of the evidence. That aspect of Furman must operate for the most part independently of the Eddings rule. This is essential to the effectiveness

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