Cite as: 507 U. S. 234 (1993)
Opinion of the Court
Accordingly, we conclude that while dismissal of an appeal pending while the defendant is a fugitive may serve substantial interests, the same interests do not support a rule of dismissal for all appeals filed by former fugitives, returned to custody before invocation of the appellate system. Absent some connection between a defendant's fugitive status and his appeal, as provided when a defendant is at large during "the ongoing appellate process," Estelle, 420 U. S., at 542, n. 11, the justifications advanced for dismissal of fugitives' pending appeals generally will not apply.
We do not ignore the possibility that some actions by a defendant, though they occur while his case is before the district court, might have an impact on the appellate process sufficient to warrant an appellate sanction. For that reason, we do not hold that a court of appeals is entirely without authority to dismiss an appeal because of fugitive status predating the appeal. For example, the Eleventh Circuit, in formulating the Holmes rule, expressed concern that a long escape, even if ended before sentencing and appeal, may so delay the onset of appellate proceedings that the Government would be prejudiced in locating witnesses and presenting evidence at retrial after a successful appeal. Holmes, 680 F. 2d, at 1374; see also United States v. Persico, 853 F. 2d, at 137. We recognize that this problem might, in some instances, make dismissal an appropriate response. In the class of appeals premised on insufficiency of the evidence, however, in which petitioner's appeal falls, retrial is not permitted in the event of reversal, and this type of prejudice to the Government will not serve as a rationale for dismissal.
Similarly, a defendant's misconduct at the district court level might somehow make "meaningful appeal impossible," Holmes, 680 F. 2d, at 1374, or otherwise disrupt the appellate process so that an appellate sanction is reasonably imposed.
purpose of administering evenhanded justice. In this case, it is the dissent's proposed disposition that would produce inconsistent judgments, as petitioner served a 15-year sentence while his codefendant's conviction was reversed for insufficiency of evidence.
249
Page: Index Previous 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 NextLast modified: October 4, 2007