256
Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting
the Eleventh Circuit's process, there is no principled reason why that court should not be able to dismiss petitioner's appeal.
In addition to administration, the Eleventh Circuit's fugitive dismissal rule is supported by an interest in deterring flight and encouraging voluntary surrender. Due to the adverse effects that flight, whenever it occurs, can have on the proper functioning of the appellate process, courts of appeals have an obvious interest in deterring escape and encouraging voluntary surrender. Unfortunately, today's opinion only encourages flight and discourages surrender. To a defendant deciding whether to flee before or after filing a notice of appeal, today's decision makes the choice simple. If the defendant flees preappeal and happens to get caught after the time for filing a notice of appeal has expired, he still has the opportunity for appellate review if he can persuade a district judge to resentence him. If the district judge refuses, the defendant is at no more of a disadvantage than he would have been had he escaped after filing an appeal since flight after appeal can automatically extinguish the right to appellate review. See Molinaro, supra.
A rule permitting dismissal when a defendant's flight interrupts the appellate process protects respect for the judicial system. When a defendant escapes, whether before or after lodging an appeal, he flouts the authority of the judicial process, of which the court of appeals is an integral part. Surely the Court does not mean to argue that a defendant who escapes during district court proceedings intends only disrespect for that tribunal. Quite obviously, a fleeing defendant has no intention of returning, at least voluntarily. His flight therefore demonstrates an equal amount of disrespect for the authority of the court of appeals as it does for the district court. Viewed in this light, the "finely calibrated response" available to the district court, ante, at 247, does nothing to vindicate the affront to the appellate process. The Court's argument is not enhanced by the use of far-
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