Cite as: 507 U. S. 272 (1993)
Per Curiam
See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U. S. 390, 399 (1993); id., at 443 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). We have not considered previously whether a presumption that the defendant is innocent of other crimes attaches at the sentencing phase. But even assuming that such a presumption does attach, Lashley was not entitled to a "presumption of innocence" instruction. Under our precedents, the instruction would have been constitutionally required only if the circumstances created a genuine risk that the jury would conclude, from factors other than the State's evidence, that the defendant had committed other crimes. See, e. g., Whorton, supra, at 788-789. Lashley does not contend that any such circumstances existed in this case. As the dissent acknowledges, post, at 281, the record before the jury was completely silent on the question whether Lashley had committed prior offenses. The jury was specifically instructed that the State had the burden of proving the existence of any aggravating circumstances "beyond a reasonable doubt." Instructions Nos. 20- 21, Record 77, 79 (Jan. 29, 1982). Nothing disturbed the presumption that Lashley was a first offender.
The "circumstances" on which the dissent relies, post, at 284-285, had no bearing on the jurors' perceptions. Lashley's age and the sentence to which he was subject were irrelevant to the question whether the jury might conclude improperly that he was a repeat offender. The dissent assigns special weight to the fact that defense counsel may have decided not to introduce evidence concerning Lashley's prior criminal history for fear that the State would introduce Lashley's juvenile record. We note that, had the trial court improperly admitted evidence of Lashley's juvenile record, defense counsel could have objected and preserved the issue for appeal. In any event, the only impact that defense counsel's decision not to make the necessary proffer could have had on the jury was to deprive it of possible testimony that Lashley lacked a criminal history. Without such testimony, the record before the jury was still silent on the question of Lashley's
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