284
Stevens, J., dissenting
"The presumption of innocence, although not articulated in the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice. Long ago this Court stated: " 'The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.' Coffin v. United States, 156 U. S. 432, 453 (1895)." Id., at 503.
The failure to instruct the jury on the presumption may violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment even when a proper instruction on the prosecution's burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt has been given. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U. S. 478 (1978). Whether the omission amounts to a constitutional violation in a non-capital case depends on "the totality of the circumstances," Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U. S. 786, 789 (1979). In my judgment, the instruction should always be given in a capital case.
That conclusion is not essential to my appraisal of the capital case before us today, however, because the totality of circumstances here included respondent's age, the sentence to which he was subject, and—of special importance—the trial judge's erroneous refusal to prohibit cross-examination about his juvenile record. As Chief Judge Arnold explained:
"[T]rial counsel made a reasonable effort to introduce [affirmative evidence showing that petitioner had no significant criminal history] but was prevented from doing so by an incorrect ruling of the state trial court. The court told counsel that if she insisted on offering evidence that Lashley had no criminal record, it would permit the state to counter this evidence by showing that petitioner had committed juvenile offenses. This ruling
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